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INTRODUCTION
The ability to make the rational decisions that lead to optimum therapeutic out-
comes is one of the cardinal characteristics ofan outstanding clinician. Nonetheless,
most of the energy expended in the education of medical students and house officers
is directed into teaching a huge body of facts and methods for gathering and inter-
preting data; little or no attention is given to the principles that underlieclinical deci-
sion making. In fact, the principles ofdecision making are often obscured by the sub-
stitution of established protocols; that is, standard methods or rules ofprocedure for
a given clinical situation. For example: Operate for suspected appendicitis, give digi-
talis for cardiac failure, or carry out renal arteriography for hypertension. The ap-
plication of protocols has become so widespread that for many diseases students
eagerly commit to memory a "treatment of choice." We are often chagrined when
students or house officers proposed to give the usual therapeutic dose ofdigitalis to
patients with myxedema or chronic pulmonary disease or when they recommend
pulmonary arteriography in a patient with clear-cut evidence of pulmonary
embolism. But should we be surprised? They areonly following the rules that we have
laid out for them, notgoing back to first principles.
In recent years a numberofmethods have been developed to complement thedeci-
sion-making capabilities ofthe student and physician. Oneofthese, decision analysis,
found its earliest application in fields widely diverse from medicine such as military
planning, economics, and marketing (1-3). Increasingly, this technique has filtered
into the medical literature describing methods fordealing with clinical problems such
as cancer (4), acute renal failure (5), pleural effusion (6), renovascular hypertension
(7,8), appendicitis, and pulmonary embolism (9). Despite the potential usefulness of
this explicit approach to the unstructured decision making that characterizes most
clinical problems, decision analysis has not yet gained a foothold either in the cur-
riculum or at the bedside. In part, lack offamiliarity with the methods employed and
with terms such as "decision trees," "chance nodes," "utilities," and "expected
value" may account for the sluggish acceptance. This paper, an elementary introduc-
tion to the principles of decision analysis, will describe the method and some of the
simple calculations involved, illustrate its use in the analysis of a complex clinical
problem, and consider various aspects ofits application in the practice and teaching
ofclinical medicine.
'Address reprint requests to: Dr. Kassirer at 171 Harrison Avenue, Boston, Mass. 02111.
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THE ELEMENTS OF A DECISION
Choosing between two or more possible courses ofaction requires that the choices
are clearly identified and that a method is available to assess theoverall value ofthe
outcome of each choice. Two elements critically influence the decision-making
process. First, our decisions usually must be made with some degree of uncertainty
about the future. Second, the various possible outcomes of our decisions have
different values to us.
Suppose we are invited for an ocean sail, but to reach the coast requires a 2-hr
drive through heavy traffic; suppose also that on the morning of the outing we ob-
serve many ominous nimbus clouds in the sky. In this case, our decision will be
influenced by the likelihood, orprobability, ofrain. We shall assume that, ifwe could
be assured that it will not rain, we would venture forth, whereas, if we were certain
that it will rain, we would not. In this example there is some uncertainty about the
prospect of rain, and we must make an assessment about its probability. To make a
logical decision we must also be able to make a subjective assessment ofthevalue, or
utility, or each possible outcome. If we decide to drive to the coast and weather con-
ditions are favorable, the outcome will consist ofgood sailing (very high utility), but if
heavy rains occur the outcome will consist ofwasted driving effort (very low utility).
On the other hand, ifwe decide not to take thedrive and the weather is poor, the out-
come will consist of avoiding the tedious drive and using the time at home construc-
tively (moderately high utility). But if we stay at home and the weather remains ex-
cellent, the outcome is a loss of the pleasurable experience of sailing (low utility).
Notice that each of these outcomes is quite different qualitatively, yet the decision
maker must be able to state his preferences about the various outcomes and compare
their values on a common scale.
The discipline ofdecision analysis encompasses all ofthese factors; it involves lay-
ing out the options and possible outcomes in explicit detail using a "decision tree,"
assessing the probabilities and values of each outcome, and selecting the "best"
choice.
THE COMPLEXITIES OF A CLINICAL PROBLEM
Many of the elements of clinical decision making can be illustrated by considering
the process a skilled physician might utilize in thinking about how to deal with a
specific patient. Suppose a patient was encountered who had had a splenectomy a
month earlier and now showed clinical findings suggestive, but not diagnostic, of a
subphrenic abscess. The physician might consider many factors before deciding
whether or not to operate. How likely is it that an abscess is present? Could the
clinical findings be explained by a medically treatable disorder, for example,
pancreatitis? If the patient is subjected to surgery, will a surgical or anesthetic com-
plication occur, and how serious will such an event be? If surgery is carried out, will
the surgeon be able to deal successfully with the abscess? How serious will it be ifthe
lesion is not adequately excised or drained? What are the consequences of failing to
operate if the patient has a surgically correctable lesion? Would a surgical lesion re-
solve under medical therapy? If so, how often would this occur and how often would
complications occur? How serious would thesecomplications be?
Though these questions and perhaps others should be considered in dealing with a
clinical problem such as the one described, the integration ofall this diverseinforma-
tion into a reasoned decision is not a simple matter. The integrative process is usually
carried out in a tacit fashion, largely because most physicians do not have command
of an explicit method for therapeutic decision making. Such an explicit decision-
making method will be described here.
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HELP THE QUARTERBACK
Before going on in greater depth into the principles of medical decision making, a
simple example ofthe use ofdecision analysis will be shown for the reader unfamiliar
with this technique: Though the example to be shown is not directly analogous to the
problems encountered in clinical medicine, it does illustrate how probabilities and
values can be expressed explicitly and how these elements can be incorporated into
the decision-making process. Assume the following conditions:
The quarterback's team has possession of the ball on the 18-yard line of his op-
ponent and with 1 minute left in the game his team trails by four points. It is the
fourth down, with 5 yards to go for a first down.
Analysis. The choices are to pass, kick a field goal, or attempt a running play.
Before the quarterback can decide which choice to make, however, he must know
what the outcomes of each choice might be. A decision tree representing the choices
and possible outcomes is shown in Fig. 1. At the square node, the choice is in the
hands of the decision maker (the quarterback); at the circular nodes the outcome is
dictated by chance. Next, the quarterback must assess the likelihood of each out-
come. The probabilities he selects for each outcome are shown in Fig. I. These
probabilities are based not only on objective historical data (for example, the average
yardage gained by his running backs, the success of his pass receivers, and the ac-
curacy of his field goal kicker), but they are also tailored for the actual conditions of
the game at that moment. Injury to his offensive line, experience with the defense
earlier in the game, the condition of the field, psychological pressures, and many
other factors will influence the likelihood of each of the possible outcomes and will
make it necessary to make a subjective adjustment ofsomeor all oftheprobabilities.
Even when the quarterback is assured that the probabilities represent his best
CHOICES OUTCOMES a PROBABILITIES
TOUCHDOWN .10
COMPLETE ISt DOWN .50
.40 | SHORTOF1st DOWN .40
INCOMPLETE
.48
.06
RECOVERY .50
FUMBLE FROM CENTER
.03 I TURN-OVER .50
THROWN FOR LOSS
.03
GOOD
ATTEMPT FIELD GOAL .90
NOT GOOD
.10
TOUCHDOWN
.02
1st DOWN
.15
RUN SHORTOF 1st DOWN
.78
RECOVERY .50
FUMBLE
.03 TURN-OVER .50
LOSS
.02
FIG. 1. Decision tree for the football example described in the text. At the square node, the choice is in
the hands of the decision maker (the quarterback), and at the circular nodes the outcome is dictated by
chance. The probabilities ofeach outcome, as estimated by thequarterback, are shown on each branch.
151JEROME P. KASSIRER
TABLE 1
Utilities
Outcomes (units)
Touchdown 1000
First down 500
Field goal 20
Short offirst down 0
Incomplete pass 0
Fumble with recovery 0
Loss 0
Fumble with turnover -50
Intercepted pass -100
judgment, he is not yet in a position to make a decision. Even though the probability
of a field goal is 0.9, for example, its value is limited because it generates only 3 points
and fails to win the game; on the other hand, the probability that a pass will lead to a
touchdown is low, but the value of this outcome is high. It should be apparent from
these remarks that the relative worth of each of the alternate courses of action is a
function of both the probability of the outcome and the value, or utility, of the out-
come. Thus, in order to obtain some index of the worth of each outcome it is
necessary to develop an assessment of the utility of the outcome. In this case let us
set up an arbitrary scale of relative units. On this scale, let us assume that a touch-
down has the value of 1000 units, a field goal 20 units, and an intercepted pass -100
units. The utilities of the remaining outcomes and the relative value scale of all the
possible outcomes are shown in Table 1.
CHOICES OUTCOMES a PROBABILITIES
3 TOUCHDOWN .10
COMPLETE - 1st DOWN .50
.40 SHORT OF 1st DOWN .40
INCOMPLETE
.48
N.TRCFPTION
.06
'~5RECOVERY .50
FUMBLE FROM CENTERRE
.03 TURN-OVER .50
THROWN FOR LOSS
.03
(~7~) GOOD
ATTEMPT FIELD A .90
NOT GOOD
.10
TOUCHDOWN
.02
1st DOWN
.15
RUN SHORT OF 1st DOWN
.78
5 RECOVERY .50
FUMBLE .
.03 TURN-OVER .50
LOSS
UTILITIES
(1000)
(500)
(0)
(0)
(-100)
(0)
(-50)
(0)
(20)
(0)
(1000)
(500)
(0)
(0)
(-50)
(0)
.02
FIG. 2. Solution of the decision tree for the football example described in the text. The expected value
of each node is shown in the accompanying oval. The expected value of the option to pass (133.2) exceeds
that ofrunning or attempting a field goal and the quarterback elects to pass.
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Having assigned both probabilities and utilities to each of the outcomes, the
quarterback is now in a position to calculate the value of each outcome (Fig. 2).
Starting at the terminal branches, the value of an outcome (for example, the top
branch, "touchdown") is calculated by multiplying the probability of the outcome
(0.1) and the utility (1000 units). When the values of the three terminal branches of
the upper node (following "complete") are calculated, their sum (350 units)
represents the expected value of that branch. Similar calculations are made from the
end branches to the branches closest to the decision node. Then, after the expected
value of all three choices have been calculated, the "best" choice is the one with the
highest expected value. In the example shown in Figs. 1 and 2 the expected value of
passing of 133.2 units exceeds that of the other options and signifies that the best
choice is to pass.
Assuming the quarterback has made his analysis ofthis play in the detail described
here, he is in an excellent position after the game to explain, and if necessary to
defend, his decision. Any disagreements about the decision can be isolated and
identified with reasonable precision because the decision-making process was explicit
not only in the facts involved but also in the process by which the choice was made.
Disagreements might involve the structure ofthe problem (i.e., the choices available)
or the assigned values for the probabilities and utilities of each outcome. The value of
this explicit approach in teaching the principles of decision making to the fledgling
quarterback should be evident.
CLINICAL DECISION MAKING
The principal decisions made by physicians involve either the performance ofdiag-
nostic tests or the administration of a therapeutic procedure or agent. Such decisions
involving both tests and treatments have features closely analogous to those in the
football example described above: The physician must make a choice between treat-
ing and not treating; between one treatment and another or many others; between a
test and a treatment; or between many tests and many different treatments. Un-
certainty is also an important aspect of clinical medicine. The physician frequently
must make therapeutic decisions in the absence of a proven diagnosis. Whether or
not to operate for suspected ischemic colitis and whether or not to give a prolonged
course of intravenous antibiotics for suspected endocarditis are two examples. Fi-
nally, both tests and treatments have a limited number ofoutcomes. These outcomes
represent either a benefit or a cost (risk) to the patient and both a probability and
utility can be assigned to each outcome.
The Costs and Benefits ofTests and Treatments
Assessment of the value of tests and treatments is a central aspect of the explicit
decision-making process. Tests have more or less value depending on how much they
advance the state of diagnostic knowledge for the patient in question. Tests with a
relatively high frequency of false-positive and false-negative results (such as lung
scans for pulmonary emboli) have less information content than tests with a low fre-
quency offalse-positives and -negatives (such as pulmonary and renal arteriography).
Methods for combining data concerning the suspected diagnosis, the results of tests,
and the errors inherent in test analysis will not be considered here but can be found
elsewhere (5,7,10-15). The cost of the test must also be included in assessing its
value. Cost may be assessed in terms of monetary expense, discomfort induced, or
risk of death, or it may be represented in some uniform utility unit which combines
all of these potential costs. Selection of tests based on a balancing of the benefits and
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costs of the various tests available accounts for many of the familiar sequences in a
diagnostic evaluation. In evaluation of a pulmonary lesion, for example, a typical se-
quence may be tomography and sputum cytology (very low cost, limited diagnostic
value), followed by bronchoscopy (low cost, moderate diagnostic value), and finally
lung biopsy (high cost, high value).
Treatments may also have value for the patient, but they, too, exact certain costs.
Treatment may improve or cure the patient and it may induce a variety ofcomplica-
tions. The benefit of the treatment can be measured in terms ofalleviation ofsuffer-
ing or reduction in mortality or, as described above for tests, the benefit can be
represented in a general utility unit that includes both morbidity and mortality
evaluations. Similarly, the complications induced by treatment such as serious drug
reactions, metabolic disturbances, postoperative wound infections, and death are the
costs of therapy. These costs are paid not only by treated patients who have the
disease for which therapy is prescribed but also by those patients who are thought to
have the disease but in reality are either normal or are suffering from some other
disorder not benefited by the treatment employed.
In order to determine the expected value ofthe outcome ofadministering a treat-
ment it is necessary to assess several factors: (i) the probability ofthe various com-
plications of therapy, (ii) the gravity (utility) of each of the complications, (iii) the
probability of the various therapeutic outcomes, and (iv) the utility of each of the
responses to therapy. To use a concrete example to illustrate alternative courses of
action and possible outcomes: If a physician is deciding how to treat a patient in
whom the diagnosis of mycoplasma pneumonia is highly likely, the problem might be
expressed in the following fashion. Therapeutic choices include erythromycin,
tetracycline, and no therapy. With erythromycin the patient may be cured, may
improve, or may not change. In addition, erythromycin may induce nausea and
vomiting, a drug rash, or a fatal blood dyscrasia. There is some probability and a
certain utility of each of these outcomes. Similar considerations hold for tetracycline
and, with the exception ofdrug-related results and complications, for no therapy.
Assessment ofProbabilities
Clearly, the technique described here requires much greater precision in the
assignment ofprobabilities than that which usually characterizes thedaily practiceof
medicine. We often speak of outcomes that are infrequent, unusual, uncommon, or
rare but, for each of these somewhat qualitative likelihood assessments, one indi-
vidual may set the probability at 1 in 10, another at 1 in 100, and another at 1 in 1000!
The same reasoning holds for the equally vague adjectives typical, common,
frequent, and usual.
Empirical clinical studies are the basis of our determinations of the values and the
risks of both tests and treatments and from these studies it is possible to derive
reasonably accurate assessments of the probabilities of outcomes. An intravenous
pyelogram, for example, is complicated by a risk ofdeath of 1 in 40,000 and a risk of
serious morbidity (anaphylaxis, arrhythmias, vascular collapse) of 1 in 14,000 (16).
Chloramphenicol cures 95 in 100 patients with typhoid fever (17), but the risk of
death from aplastic anemia is 1 in 30,000 (18).
Common sense dictates that such statistical data culled from the medical litera-
ture cannot and should not be applied to all patients. The risk of liver biopsy, for
example, is considerably increased in the face of a disturbance in the coagulation
mechanism. Similarly, the risk is increased ifthe biopsy is carried out by a novice or
if adequate nursing supervision is not available in the several hours following the
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procedure. Many factors such as the age of the patient, the hematologic status, the
presence of coronary artery disease, and the history ofdrug sensitivity reactions call
for an adjustment or tailoring of the probabilities involved for the specific cohort. In
many instances data adjusted to various cohorts in various clinical situations have
been collected in clinical studies, and it is possible to use accurate cohort-adjusted
probabilities from these studies in explicit analysis ofclinical decisions.
Objective measures of probability are not always available, however, sometimes
because a certain type ofclinical problem has not been studied adequately or because
a test or treatment has not yet been widely utilized. In situations such as these, it is
still possible to carry out decision analysis, deriving the probability values from sub-
jective estimates. If, for example, the risk of nephrolithotomy in a pregnant woman
with recurrent acute pyelonephritis cannot be found by search of either the gyneco-
logic or the nephrologic literature, probabilities derived from a consensus of
experienced gynecologists and nephrologists could be used when deciding whether or
not to operate. Experience with decision analysis in a hospital setting confirms the
clinical usefulness ofsuch subjective assessments.
Assessment ofUtilities
The assessment of utilities is more complex than the assignment of probabilities,
chiefly because utilities are indices of value, and judgments concerning value must
necessarily be subjective in character. A large variety of outcomes results from the
various tests and treatments available to clinicians. On the positive side these out-
comes include cure of a disease, alleviation of suffering, elimination or reduction of
monetary expenditure, establishment of a diagnosis, and many others. On the nega-
tive side are outcomes such as physical and emotional disability, prolongation of hos-
pitalization, pain, and death. In any given clinical situation several of these outcomes
can be anticipated as a consequence of one or more of the decisions to test or treat.
For this reason it is important to be able to compare the utilities of a number of out-
comes with widely differing characteristics; for example, it is necessary to compare
the potential positive value of alleviation of pain with the potential negative value of
complications of a drug or surgical procedure that might be utilized to relieve the
pain.
When all of the outcomes can be given a utility measured in a single unit (such as
monetary cost) we can use so-called unidimensional utilities; they are readily ordered
and compared. But medical outcomes are usually multifaceted; since outcomes such
as pain, drug complications, and death are measured in different units, comparison
and ordering of these facets requires that a common and consistent numerical utility
unit be developed to express all ofthem. Such utilities are called multidimensional. If
restoration of normal health were given a utility value of 100 units and if death
following a prolonged painful illness were given a utility value of 0 units, a dollar ex-
penditure of $5000 might be assigned 20 or 30 units, an anaphylactic reaction to a
drug might be assigned 10 units, and improvement ofhealth to the point where the in-
dividual could return to work on a part-time basis might be assigned 60 or 65 units,
etc. Methods for assessing multidimensional utilities such as these in a consistent
fashion are available but are too complex to be considered here in any greater detail
(1, 19-21).
Though the assessment of probabilities is exclusively the responsibility of the phy-
sician, the assessment of utilities must be done in cooperation with the patient and
the family. Since different individuals assess the value of outcomes differently, it is
critical when assigning utilities to "debrief" the patient in order to use his or her sub-
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jectivejudgments ofvalues rather than those of the physician. There is a wide range
of attitudes among patients toward the costs of tests and treatments. One 45-year-
old patient may prefer to take antihypertensive medications for an indefinite period
to the risks and discomforts involved in a diagnostic evaluation and surgical correc-
tion ofhypertension that may be of renovascular origin. Another patient belonging to
the same cohort with respect to age, cardiovascular status, and other features may
prefer the risks of the diagnostic and operative maneuvers to the prolonged need for
drug therapy.
In instances in which decision analysis is used for a class ofpatients rather than to
solve the problem of an individual patient, it will be necessary to includein the assess-
ment of utilities some measure ofthe value to society. Decisions regarding the alloca-
tion of scarce health resources often must take such considerations into account.
Whether to allocate funds to programs for the patient with chronic renal failure or to
programs for research into the causes of coronary artery disease are examples ofde-
cisions in this class that require utility assessments adjusted for the needs ofsociety
rather than for that ofthe individual.
APPLICATION OF DECISION ANALYSIS TO A CLINICAL PROBLEM
In an earlier section, the complexities involved in deciding whether or not to
operate on a patient suspected of having a subphrenic abscess were outlined briefly.
In this section decision analysis is used to solve a problem of such a patient actually
encountered at the Yale-New Haven Hospital in late 1974.2 The example selected
for this analysis involving a decision whether or not to treat does not, like many
medical decisions, include an additional decision on whether or not to administer a
test. This therapeutic problem is convenient for our purpose since the principles can
be illustrated without undue complexity.
Two decisions whether or not to operate will be considered; the first on December
8, when the diagnosis of subphrenic abscess was not very likely and the patient was
only moderately ill; and the second on December 24, when the diagnosis was more
certain but the patient had become seriously ill.
Decision I
(a) Initial clinical course (up to December 8). A 24-year-old woman had both
kidneys removed in February, 1972, for bilateral hypernephromas. After a stormy
clinical course on dialysis complicated by pericarditis and severe neuropathy, she
received a kidney transplant from a cadaver donor in October, 1974. Early in
November, 1974, a splenectomy was carried out to correct leukopenia and
thrombocytopenia that had impeded the continuance ofimmunosuppressive therapy.
Late in November she was successfully treated with cephalosporin for Klebsiella
sepsis and left lower lobe pneumonia. On December 3, 1974, she was readmitted to
the hospital with fever (104.20 F), nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea and was found to
have rales in the left base but no abdominal findings. Over the next several days, the
symptoms intensified and on December 8 she had severe left upper quadrant ab-
dominal pain radiating to the left shoulder, generalized abdominal tenderness,
diminished bowel sounds, splinting of the left chest, and poor movement of the left
diaphragm. The white count was 8900. The diagnosis of subdiaphragmatic abscess
was considered at this time, and the possibility of surgery was first raised. The deci-
sion tree in Fig. 3 is a representation ofthis decision.
2This paper is based on a presentation at Medical Grand Rounds at the Yale-New Haven Hospital in
February, 1975.
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CHOICES OUTCOMES & PROBABILITIES UTILITIES
8 LESION REPAIRED .90 (95)
NO SURGICAL SPONT. .25 (95)
NOT .10 SERIOUS .20 (65)
REPAIRED COMP.
DEATH .55 (0)
NO S. C 0LESION REPAIRED .90 (65)
NO-SURG. CORR. SERIOUS SURG SPONT.C25 (65)
LESION .30 COP 221 RSLTN
NOT 10 SERIOUS .20 (25)
(@ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~REPAIRED COMP.
SURGERY DET 5 (O)
DEATH .25 (0)
SPNO SURGE COMP. .50 (95)
NON-SURG. CORR. SERIOUS SURG. COMP. .25 (65)
LESION .70
J ~~~~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~DEATH .25 (O)
SPONT. RESOLUTION .25 (100)
SURG. CORR. (l,SERIOUS COMP. .20 (60)
) LESION .30.
NO SURGERY DEATH .55 (0)
NON-SURG. CORR. (100)
LESION .70
FIG. 3. Decision tree for a patient suspected of having a subphrenic abscess (December 8). Details of
the patient's course are described in the text. The consequences ofoperating and not operating are shown,
along with the probability and utility of each outcome. As in the other figures, the expected value of each
node is shown in the accompanying oval. At this time the "best" decision is not to operate, since the ex-
pected valueofno surgery exceeds thatofsurgery.
(b) Summary of the decision-making process. The choices (Fig. 3, square node)
available to those responsible for the patient were either to operate or not to operate,
and the consequences of both choices can be described explicitly. On December 8
there was considerable uncertainty about the diagnosis ofsubphrenic abscess. If sur-
gery were carried out (upper branch), a surgically correctable abscess may or may
not be present. Following the branches in the figure across from left to right, a series
ofpossible outcomes is represented: Whether the lesion is present or not, the patient
may suffer a complication of surgery and the complication may or may not be
serious. If a surgically correctable lesion is found, it may or may not be possible to
fully evacuate the abscess. If the abscess can be evacuated, the outcome should be
excellent; however, ifit cannot be fully removed, the lesion may resolve with medical
therapy or may lead to sepsis and death.
The outcomes of medical therapy are represented in Fig. 3 in a similar fashion. If
surgery is not carried out, the patient will presumably recover if a nonsurgical lesion
(for example, acute pancreatitis) is the causeoftheillness (lowest branch). Ifsurgery
is not carried out and the patient actually has a surgically correctable lesion, the out-
come would be nearly the same as the lesion described above that was not entirely
removed surgically: There would be some chance ofspontaneous resolution and some
chance ofa serious outcome.
(c) Assessment of probabilities. We shall assume that on December 8 the
probability of a surgically accessible lesion was 0.3 and that of a nonsurgically ac-
cessible lesion was 0.7. Stated in other terms, we have estimated that 30% ofpatientsJEROME P. KASSIRER
TABLE 2
Utilities
Outcomes (units)
No surgery, spontaneous resolution oflesion 100
Surgery, no complication, lesion repaired 95
Surgery, no surgical complication, lesion not repaired
surgically, serious complication oflesion 65
Surgery, serious surgical complication, lesion repaired 65
Surgery, serious surgical complication, lesion
not repaired but resolved spontaneously 65
No surgery, surgically correctable lesion,
serious complication oflesion 60
Surgery, serious surgical complication, lesion
not repaired, serious complication oflesion 25
Death 0
with a clinical picture comparable to that shown by this patient on this date would
have a subphrenic abscess and 70% would not (Fig. 3).
Some of the probabilities required for the analysis of this problem were found in
clinical studies of patients with subphrenic abscess (23-27). The other probabilities
utilized here were estimates ofan experienced abdominal surgeon (28). The mortality
rate in operated patients averages 25% (range 16-43%) and in nonoperated patients
ranges between 43 and 85% (23-26); a value of 55% was used for this latter group.
Serious complications (fistulas, abscess rupture, sepsis, cardiovascular complica-
tions) occur in another 25% oftheoperated patients and in approximately 20% ofthe
nonoperated patients (28). In approximately 10% of the patients the abscess is not
adequately drained in the initial operative approach (28). The mortality rate in this
group of patients is 55% (23). The probabilities utilized in the decision tree in Fig. 3
for December 8 are derived from these data.
(d) Assessment of utilities. The utilities used in these analyses (Table 2) were
derived by the author; the patient was not available when this analysis was carried
out. In the nonmedical example illustrated earlier, both positive and negative utilities
were used to assess the value of outcomes. In this clinical example only positive
utilities will be used in order to demonstrate that either scale is applicable when solv-
ing complex decisions in this fashion. The best outcome, i.e., spontaneous resolution
of either a surgically correctable lesion or a nonsurgical lesion was assigned 100
units. The worst outcome, i.e., death, was assigned 0 units. A toll of 5 units was
exacted for the discomfort and expense of surgery whether or not a surgically ac-
cessible lesion was present. A toll of30 units was paid for a serious surgical complica-
tion assuming that such a complication would entail discomfort, prolongation ofhos-
pitalization, loss ofincome, and psychological consequences. Finally, a toll of40 units
was paid for serious complications ofa surgically correctable lesion in the patient not
subjected to surgery.
(e) Calculations and results. As shown in Fig. 3, on December 8 the expected
value for surgery is 62.5 units and that ofno surgery is 81.1 units. Since the expected
value of no surgery exceeds the expected value of surgery, the best decision on that
date is to treat the patient medically.
Decision 2
(a) Later clinical course (December 8 to December 24). On December 8 it was
decided to treat the patient with nasogastric suction, fluids, and antibiotics rather
158DECISION ANALYSIS
than explore the left flank. Over the next several days, the patient improved but
within a week the same symptoms recurred. On December 15 an ultrasound study
gave suggestive evidence of a collection of fluid near the tail of the pancreas and a
gallium scan showed increased uptake in the area of the splenic flexure. Again the
patient improved on a regimen consisting of nasogastric suction, fluid therapy, and
antibiotics, but on December 24 all of the previous symptoms recurred, the white
count was found to be 12,600 with a shift to the left and a space was identified
between the stomach and the diaphragm on an abdominal plain film. The patient ap-
peared acutely and chronically ill; her blood pressure was 70/50 mm Hg. Again a
subdiaphragmatic abscess was suspected and the possibility of surgery was raised.
The decision ofDecember 24 is also considered in detail below.
(b) Summary of the decision-making process. As shown in the decision tree in
Fig. 4, both the choices available (surgery vs no surgery) and the possible outcomes
on December 24 are the same as those described earlier.
(c) Assessment ofprobabilities. By December 24, the new data available from the
evolving clinical course, the change in white cell count, and the results ofechography,
scan, and plain film markedly increased the probability of a surgically accessible le-
sion. We shall assume that this a priori probability is 0.95, and thus the a priori
probability of a nonsurgically correctable lesion is 0.05. Many of the probabilities
utilized in the decision tree in Fig. 4 for December 24 were not found in a review of
published cases because data on nonoperative resolution ofthe abscess and complica-
tions were not available for a cohort of patients whose illness was complicated by
hypotension and sepsis. For this date, the probability ofa serious complication ofsur-
gery was estimated to have increased from 0.25 to 0.50 and the probability ofdeath
CHOICES OUTCOMES a PROBABILITIES UTILITIES
LESION REPAIRED .90 (95)
SURG. CORR. RNOU SURGICAL SPONT. .10 (65)
COMP. 10 11.5 RESOLUTION
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FIG. 4. Decision tree for the same patient shown in Fig. 3 but for a later date (December 24). At this
time the probability ofa surgically correctable lesion is very high and the "best" decision is to operate (ex-
pected value of surgery exceeds that of no surgery), even though the risks of serious complications and
death from surgery have increased.
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from 0.25 to 0.40. Likewise, the probability of nonoperative resolution of the lesion
was estimated to have fallen from 0.25 to 0.10, and the probability ofdeath from an
unoperated surgically correctable lesion was estimated to have increased from 0.55
to 0.70 by December 24.
(d) Assessment ofutilities. The utilities employed in the analysis ofthedecision of
December 24 are the same as those used earlier.
(e) Calculations and results. On December 24, as shown in Fig. 4, the risk ofsur-
gery has increased remarkably because of the deterioration in the patient's clinical
state. Nonetheless, the expected value of surgery at that time (38.9 units) exceeds
that of no surgery (25.9 units) and the surgical approach is warranted despite the
very high risk. One of the chief reasons why the surgical approach is favored stems
from the striking increase in the probability ofa surgical accessible lesion, from 30%
on December 8 to 95% on December 24.
It is of considerable interest to compare the final expected values for the decision
on December 8 and December 24 to the scale of utilities in Table 2. The derived ex-
pected values are a measure ofthe overall worth ofeach therapeutic choice; they are
measured in the same units as the utilities assigned to the individual outcomes
illustrated on the end branches, and they belong to the same relative value scale. Ac-
cordingly, the expected value of each choice can be compared to the utility of cure
and of dying and to the other outcomes. On December 8 the expected value of the
best choice, i.e., no surgery, was 81.1 units, a value high on the utility scale. On
December 24, however, the expected value ofthe best choice, i.e., surgery, was only
38.9 units, a value greater only than that for death and for multiple serious complica-
tions. Thus, even the best outcome on this date has serious prognostic implications.
Some ofthe advantages ofthis approach should be evident by studying the two de-
cision trees shown for this patient. Outcomes, probabilities, and utilities are
displayed for ready inspection. Comparison is easily carried out between the earlier
and later decisions. Students observing thedecision-making process openly displayed
can readily understand the principles used and the data that were employed. All in
all, the technique represents a considerable advance over the obscure decision-
making processes moreoften utilized.
DISCUSSION
In this paper the principles of decision analysis have been described, and the
method has been illustrated for a patient suspected of having a subphrenic abscess.
In carrying out this type of explicit analysis of a clinical problem, a decision tree is
constructed to include the choices (options) available and the various outcomes of
each choice. Assignment of a probability and utility (a measureofworth)ofeach out-
come completes the decision tree and a simple arithmetic calculation yields an "ex-
pected value" for each option. The option with the highest expected value is then
selected as the best balance between risks and benefits.
PracticalApplications
In the example cited in detail above, the method was used in its entirety: All major
outcomes were considered, probabilities and utilities were assigned to all outcomes,
and a formal calculation ofexpected value was carried out. Experience with decision
analysis in a clinical inpatient setting shows that the complete mathematical analysis
carried out as in the example above is needed foronly a small fraction ofthecomplex
clinical problems encountered on a day-to-day basis. Very often construction of the
decision tree alone forces the physician to do one of the tasks that is often ignored:
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anticipating the possible outcomes of a given action. Why carry out a renal arterio-
gram if the result will be of no value in treating the patient; why carry out a liver
biopsy if there is virtually no expectation that therapy will be altered by the informa-
tion obtained? Explicit definition of the possible outcomes tends to prevent this com-
mon trap.
In the clinical situations in which formal construction of a decision tree appears
warranted, methods are available for simplifying the tree and its attendant calcula-
tions. This method involves eliminating (pruning) branches of the tree, making it less
"bushy." Branches can be pruned only if it is obvious from inspection that the
probability and utility of the outcome are such that their combination will yield a
value that will contribute little or not at all to the expected value of the outcome. A
detailed description of a pruned version of a "bushy" decision tree is presented in de-
tail elsewhere (7).
Sensitivity Analysis
Experienced clinicians appreciate that even the "objective" data from clinical
studies often represent only an approximation of the probability of a given outcome.
They are accustomed to discrepancies between two clinical studies: One may show a
response rate of 60% and another rate of 80%; one may show a 1% rate of serious
complications of a procedure and another a 5% rate. Such discrepancies as well as
variations in subjectively assessed probabilities (and utilities) do not abrogate the
usefulness ofdecision analysis in clinical medicine. Rather, they enhance the value of
this technique. Because the decision is laid out explicitly, it is possible to test the im-
pact of discrepant values on the final decision. This process of testing whether varia-
tions in probabilities or utilities influence a given decision is known as "sensitivity
analysis."
The process can be illustrated nicely by the clinical problem of subphrenic abscess
considered earlier. On December 8 the expected value of surgery was 62.5 units and
the expected value of no surgery was 81.1 units; thus no surgery was the "best"
choice. These expected values were based in part on an operative mortality rate of
25%. In fact, studies of patients with subphrenic abscesses have reported operative
mortality rates ranging between 16 and 43% (23-26). If we use each of the values
bounding this range and recalculate the expected value of surgery (keeping the
probability of a serious surgical complication constant), the two expected values for
surgery are 71.0 and 45.8 units for mortality rates of 16 and 43%, respectively. Since
both ofthese expected values are lower than the expected value ofno surgery, the de-
cision stands as before: The "best" decision on December 8 is not to operate. Thus,
the decision was not sensitive (i.e., not changed) throughout the range studied for this
particular variable, namely the operative mortality rate.
Similar analysis could be carried out for any of the probabilities or utilities used. If
the decision proves to be sensitive to one or more of the values substituted, additional
data gathering or more careful consideration of existing data may be necessary. Un-
fortunately, sensitivity analysis can be tedious if it becomes necessary to test a large
number of probabilities or utilities. Computer analysis simplifies this task but is not
generally available. A new technique of sensitivity analysis that can be applied to
therapeutic decisions without the aid of a computer has been described elsewhere (9).
This technique, derived from decision analysis, is applicable in a wide variety of
medical and surgical settings and has been illustrated for two common clinical prob-
lems, pulmonary embolism and acute appendicitis. No matter which method is used,
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however, sensitivity analysis makes it possible to assess the importance of "soft"
clinical data on the decision-making process.
Importanceofthe Outcome in Assessing the Decision
Decision analysis emphasizes the seldom appreciated phenomenon that outcomes
predicated on probabilities are dictated by chance alone. Restated in terms ofprob-
lems that physicians face, rational decisions made on the basis of the best data and
value judgments do not always lead to the best outcomes and, in fact, poor decisions
sometimes yield excellent outcomes (21). These principles are readily illustrated.
Suppose a patient without a history ofallergy or drug sensitivity is given penicillin for
pneumococcal pneumonia and has a fatal anaphylactic reaction to the drug. In the
case of pneumococcal pneumonia, penicillin therapy has been shown to have a high
expected value: The fatal outcome was an event with a very small statistical likeli-
hood. Here the decision was excellent, the outcome grave. Suppose, on the other
hand, a patient with cirrhosis of the liver and impending hepatic coma develops
massive gastrointestinal hemorrhage. Let us also assume that survival in such a
patient with surgery is 2% and with medical therapy 10%. An aggressive surgeon
may decide to operate "in the small likelihood that the lesion can be repaired and the
life of the patient saved." If he operates and the patient recovers, the outcome is ex-
cellent. Nonetheless, the decision was not.
Interpretation of outcomes is important when large numbers of cases are
analyzed, but tojudge the quality ofthe decision by the outcome in a single case must
be done with great caution. It follows, therefore, that as long as a decision is made
properly, an untoward outcome should not be construed as an error injudgment. It
also follows, however, that good decision makers should achieve better results on the
average than those who have a predetermined pattern of response for each class of
clinical problems.
Problems Yet to be Solved
It is important to point out that the techniques of decision analysis have been used
only to a limited extent in a medical environment, and it is too early to assess the
potential applicability of this method. Certain areas require particular attention,
further research, and considerable practical clinical experience. One ofthese areas is
the assignment ofprobabilities to outcomes. This process can be enhanced by collect-
ing large bodies of clinical data concerning the values and risks of tests and treat-
ments specific to a variety of cohorts. In order to make an accurate estimate of the
probability of the morbidity and mortality ofbiliary tract surgery in a given patient,
clinical studies could be designed to collect data specific to the patient's age, sex,
weight, and cardiovascular status and to a variety of external factors such as the
expertise of the surgeon, the abilities of the anesthesiologist, and the availability of
house staff for adequate postoperative coverage. We have yet to learn how much the
estimates of probabilities by experienced clinicians deviate from such "hard data"
and what impact this deviation has on thedecision-making process.
A second area requiring further study is utility assessments. The arbitrary assign-
ment ofnumerical values to outcomes such as pain, disability, and death is foreign to
patients and physicians alike. Though physicians tend to become less uncomfortable
with such utility assessments as they become experienced with decision analysis, the
popular appeal of the technique will probably be impeded unless some kind of
medically compatible multidimensional utility assessment can bedeveloped.
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A third area requiring considerable study is the estimation ofa priori probabilities
ofmedical diagnoses. Although students and physicians seem to be able to make such
estimates readily, the factors influencing such judgments have not been
characterized. In one nonmedical study ofsubjective probability assessments, a large
number of factors were found that importantly influenced the judgments (29). A
comparable study in medicine has not yet been carried out.
Finally, some method might be devised for comparing thejudgments ofone group
of physicians using conventional methods and another comparable group using deci-
sion analysis. Such an experiment is difficult to design but is probably feasible.
Although these various problems appear formidable, many or perhaps all are sub-
ject to scientific study and none is obviously insoluble. Given the anticipated
widespread application of decision analysis in the daily practice of medicine and in
the education of future physicians, it is highly desirable for the informed physician to
be familiar with the potential values and the limitations ofthis technique.
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